

# Thinking Like A Hacker

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- Application Security Tester (Professional Hacker)
- OWASP Melbourne chapter lead
- Web developer in a previous life
- Climber of rocks




#### Contact


- meetup.com/Application-Security-OWASP-Melbourne/
- @JulianBerton (Twitter not very active)
- au.linkedin.com/in/julianberton
- bertonjulian.github.io (also not very active)







- What hackers are up to?
- What motivates them to hack?
- The Hacker Mindset
- Why the current security model fails?
- Securing applications in a modern world
- How to start improving your security tomorrow?



### **Cyber Security Trends** What are the hackers up to?




# 2015 TRUSTWAVE GLOBAL SECURITY REPORT



13% increase in attacks from 2013 -2014



#### NORTH AMERICA



FINANCIAL CREDENTIALS

PROPRIETARY DATA

PII + CHD (E-COMMERCE TRANSACTION DATA)

TRACK DATA (POS TRANSACTIONS)

No credit card data or passwords stolen... But still made the ABC news

# David Jones computer system hacked and customers' private details stolen

Twitter

Business

Sport

Analysis & Opinion

Essendon charged by WorkSafe Victoria over supplements program

More

PM By Will Ockenden

Print

NEWS

Just In

BREAKING NEWS

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World

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Updated 2 Oct 2015, 11:52pm

Australian fashion retailer David Jones says its computer system has been hacked and the private details of some of its customers have been stolen by criminals.

The retailer said no credit card information or passwords were stolen, and once it discovered the issue it moved quickly to prevent any further incident.

It came a day after retailer Kmart said it had suffered from a privacy breach in which customer data was stolen.




Fact Check

Programs


PHOTO: Department store David Jones has suffered a privacy breach. (David Gray: Reuters)

# Kmart online customers' information hacked in security breach



No credit card data or passwords stolen... But still made the ABC news

#### Aussie Farmers Direct customers' data hacked



#### Hack attack: Aussie Farmers Direct home grocery delivery service chief Keith Louie. Photo: Pat Scala

Thousands of <u>Aussie Farmers Direct</u> customers have had their private information posted online in a hacking attack, the latest in a string of consumer data breaches in recent months.

The food delivery company was the target of an extortion attempt by international hackers, who demanded a six-figure sum of cash before posting the information of more than 5000 customers on October 30.

#### Hackers stole data not to sell but to extort!

Home > Cybercrime



By AFP on May 25, 2016	
Tweet	RSS

Austrian aircraft parts maker FACC said Wednesday that it has fired its chief executive of 17 years after cyber criminals stole some 50 million euros (\$55.7 million) in a so-called "fake president" scam.

FACC, whose customers include Airbus, Boeing and Rolls-Royce, said that the its supervisory board sacked Walter Stephan with immediate effect after he "severely violated his duties".


Press reports said that in January a FACC employee wired around 50 million euros, equivalent to almost 10 percent of annual revenues, after receiving emailed instructions from someone posing as Stephan.

By the time the firm, which began life making skis before expanding into aeronautics, realized the mistake, it was too late. The money had disappeared in Slovakia and Asia, the Standard daily reported.


The company said Wednesday that the scam, also known as "bogus boss" or "CEO fraud" and increasingly popular with sophisticated organized criminals, cost it 41.9 million euros in its 2015/16 business year.

Again, not going after data but after the money directly!

#### We seem to be losing the battle... But why?



#### Is Awareness To Blame?



**Inside Target's Cyber Fusion Center** 



Is Awareness To Blame?

JAN 30, 2016 @ 09:02 AM 8,918 VIEWS

## Why J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Is Spending A Half Billion Dollars On Cybersecurity




**Steve Morgan CONTRIBUTOR** *I write about the business of cybersecurity.* 



Opinions expressed by Forbes Contributors are their own.




(Photo by Spencer Platt/Getty Images)



### Hacker Motivations What do hackers want?



Like any business, cybercriminals do what they do to generate revenue. And like businesses, they prefer to make that money as quickly and efficiently as possible. **Hacker Motivations** 





#### **Politics/Government**

The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) is a group of computer hackers aimed at supporting the government of Syria.

Religion

Some terrorist and hacktivist groups hack due to certain religious beliefs.

Fun/Fame More prevalent in the early days of the internet.




#### **World Domination**

Well maybe just in the movies...



#### War/Protection

State sponsored hackers with the aim of gathering intelligence on other countries.



# What type of threats have i missed?

#### 24 Leaked AshleyMadison Emails Suggest Execs Hacked Competitors

Hacked online cheating service **AshleyMadison.com** is portraying itself as a victim of malicious cybercriminals, but leaked emails from the company's CEO suggest that AshleyMadison's top leadership hacked into a competing dating service in 2012.

Late last week, the **Impact Team** — the hacking group that has claimed responsibility for leaking personal data on more than 30 million AshleyMadison users — released a 30-gigabyte archive that it said were emails lifted from AshleyMadison **CEO Noel Biderman**.

A review of those missives shows that on at least one occasion, a former company executive hacked another dating website, exfiltrating their entire user database. On Nov. 30, 2012, **Raja Bhatia**, the founding chief technology officer of AshleyMadison.com, sent a message to Biderman notifying his boss of a security hole discovered in



AshleyMadison CEO Noel Biderman. Source: Twitter.


nerve.com, an American online magazine dedicated to sexual topics, relationships and culture.

**Insider Threat** 

# Edward Snowden and the NSA: A Lesson About Insider Threats

July 4, 2013 - 6:12 AM AEST








What Most Companies Care About

#### **Brand Damage**

Loss of customer or investor trust usually due to bad media coverage.



#### Strategic/Operational

Achieving goals and objectives are impacted.

#### Loss of Revenue

Suffers a loss of revenue either directly or indirectly.

## Making A Profit Attacking Your Employer?

How would you attack your employer?



#### Extortion

Steal data and blackmail company into giving you money or you will dump the data publically (**Brand damage**).

Threaten to take down the website or products for long periods of time, think distributed denial of service(DDOS) or deleting data / servers (**Loss of Revenue**).



#### Steal data

Steal customer credit cards and either sell on the dark markets or drain accounts (**Brand damage**).

Steal customer personally identifiable information (PII) and sell it on the dark markets for profit (**Brand damage**).



#### **Social Engineering**

Stealing customer PII and using this to steal money from them personally. Think, opening a new credit card in there name (**Brand damage**).

CEO Fraud - Tricking employees into transferring money to an attacker's account (**Loss of Revenue**)

Is your company storing PII data?

# What happens to the breached data?

#### **Extortion - Publicly Disclosed**



Stories About Data Leaks and Related Stuff


#### Shellcode

Posted by PasteMon on October 18th, 2015

86 voted 💽



```
from pwn import *
gets = 0x08048350
pop3ret = 0x804855a
leak = 0x080498dc
size_t = pack(0x0000050)
return_address = pack(0x8049914)
dest = return_address
```





#### **TOP-5 LEAKS**


Potential leak of data: VISA Credit Card (1157)


Go!

Potential leak of data: VISA Credit Card (497)

Potential leak of data: MasterCard Credit Card (428)

MasterCard Credit Card (423)





Well maybe not so anonymous...

Forbes / Security

Top 20 Stocks for 2016

OCT 2, 2013 @ 12:35 PM 221,734 VIEWS

# End Of The Silk Road: FBI Says It's Busted The Web's Biggest Anonymous Drug Black Market




#### THIS HIDDEN SITE HAS BEEN SEIZED

by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in conjunction with the IRS Criminal Investigation Division, ICE Homeland Security Investigations, and the Drug Enforcement Administration, in accordance with a seizure warrant obtained by the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 983(j) by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York





#### Sold on the Dark Web



# The Superlist

This is a list of all currently known, operating markets and tumblers. If you feel a market is missing or should be removed, please message us here explaining why. All markets listed should not be taken as endorsements or confirmation by the moderators that a market is trusted. Always confirm links before you use them.

### **Requirements for this list**

- 1. Market has to been up for at least a week after announcing their self on /r/DarkNetMarkets
- 2. Market has to have at least 20 listings from active vendors
- 3. Service must have at least 50% uptime over the span of a week, under moderator discretion.
- 4. Users must be able to withdraw their coins.

Referral links can be found in the respective market subreddit

\*

Superlist - Removed Listings

### Markets

A.C.A.S MARKET

Address: http://lpwiqq7bjenhkucm.onion Multisig: Yes Subreddit: /r/ACASMarket Forums: http://lpwiqq7bjenhkucm.onion/forum/ Reddit accounts: /u/ACASadmin PGP key: ACAS Market The Superlist Markets A.C.A.S Market Acropolis AlphaBay Crypto Market DarkNet Heroes League Dream Market East India Company Warning: Was down for 7 days - Unknown status - Use caution German-Plaza Hansa Market Nucleus Marketplace Oasis **Outlaw Marketplace** Python Market The Real Deal Market Tochka Silkkitie / Valhalla Forum Based Markets French Marketplace The Majestic Garden Popular Coin Tumblers Bitcoin Blender / BitBlender Bitcoin Fog / BitcoinFog / BTCFog

Home • Sales • Messages • Listings • Balance • Orders • Feedback • Forums • Cont

336.05 ¥AUD 512.69 ¥GBP 239.69

### Cards / \*AU\*SUPREME FULLZ\*(Australia) FULLZ\*(DOB/MMN/BILL)



2

# \*AU\*SUPREME FULLZ\*(Australia) FULLZ\*(DOB/MMN/BILL)

Ultimate Freshness guarantee at all times! This listing is for x1 AU (Australia) Fullz. \*If you need some custom request, kindly dont forget to choose from the Drop Down list on the Add On's, so it will be able to get those request guaranteed. If none of the Add-On's are taken, the order will be Issued by Randoms Fullz.\* \*\*TIP: Also have in mind, when ordering, please write in the...

### Sold by Kingsup - 224 sold since Mar 19, 2015 Level 7

No additional ext	ras/options - 1 days -	USD +0.00 / item		-		
Ends in	s in Never Payment Escrov					
Quantity left	12 items	Ships to	Worldwide			
Product class	Digital goods	Origin country	Australia			
	Features		Features			

### Purchase price: USD 25.00

Qty: 1 Buy Now Queue

### Sold on the Dark Web

**Product Description** 

Ultimate Freshness guarantee at all times!

This listing is for x1 AU (Australia) Fullz.

\*If you need some custom request, kindly dont forget to choose from the Drop Down list on the Add On's, so it will be able to get those request guaranteed. If none of the Add-On's are taken, the order will be Issued by Randoms Fullz.\*

\*\*TIP: Also have in mind, when ordering, please write in the buyer notes what to do in case your request is not available at that very moment, like if you have another choices for complete your order or if you rather me to decline in that case; so inform me everytime how to proceed and it will shorter the shipping time.\*\*

### 

You can rely on the Best Quality. State of the Art techniques on accessing them guarantees the authenticity of the product itself, and combined with a Friendly Customer service every time.

\*The fullz format\*

Known e-mail(s): I Known password(s): I Full Name: I DOB: Age: Address: I Billing Telephone: Mothers Maiden Name: + Billing Information I Card BIN: I Card Bank: I Card Type: I Cardholders Name: Card Number: Valid I Expiration date: I CVV: + Social Media Information | Details: I IP Address: LLocation: UserAgent:

# "With a friendly customer service every time"

# 66

"All of the information is accurate and confirmed. Clients are from an insurance company database with GOOD to EXCELLENT credit rating!"

I, myself was able to apply for credit cards valued from \$2,000 – \$10,000 with my fullz. Info can be used to apply for loans, credit cards, lines of credit, bank withdrawal, assume identity, account takeover."

# Sold on the Dark Web

# Kingsup I User Profile




# Kingsup( 7842 ) Level 7


Positive feedback (last 12 months): 96% [How is the feedback score calculated?]

Member since: March 19, 2015 Contracts: 0 in progress, 0 complete

### View Store Send Message Favorite Blacklist

Seller Feedback	Ratings	(last 12 m	onths)	?	<b>Buyer Statistics</b>	(since join date)	?
	1 month	6 months	12 months	6		Since	join
Positive	185	1500	364		Total disputes / orders		0/1
Neutral	3	35	8		Total spendings	0 // 00 00/	
Negative	12	59	11		Feedback left Last online	0 (100.0% posi Nov 9, 2	
Hoganito	16	1777	ealth		Quality	Value for price	
Detailed seller ratir	ngs:	1	***	*	*****	*****	





	Feedback	From	Date
0	Great transaction. As advertised.	G***e	May 26, 2016 00:57
0	Got what I paid for. Good vendor. Follows up with your questions and delivers promptly.	B***r	May 24, 2016 00:09
0	As described	y***Z	May 20, 2016 04:43

# The Hacker Mindset Stepping into the mind of a criminal

# 66

"The best possible way to focus on security, as a developer, is to begin to think like a hacker. Examine the very methods hackers use to break into and attack Web sites, and use those same practices to prevent attacks."

Developer's Guide to Web Application Security, Michael Cross, 2007

# Why do security bugs exist in software?

- The "just trying to get it released" attitude. Not given time to look at the app from a security POV.
- Most developers have never been taught about security.
- "I assume my framework is protecting me". Modern frameworks are doing more so the developer assumes it's got security covered.
- Never stepping back and thinking about the app from a hackers POV.

Let's take an example:

I'm building a .NET web app and I need to make a database query to fetch some user data... To Google you say!

asp.r	net 4 exec	uting an so	ql query				<b>୍</b>
All	Videos	Images	News	Shopping	More -	Search tools	

About 5,730,000 results (0.53 seconds)

# How to: Create and Execute an SQL Statement that Returns ... https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/fksx3b4f.aspx -

NET Framework 2.0. To execute an SQL statement that returns rows, you can run a TableAdapter query that is configured to run an SQL statement (for example, ...

sql - Executing query in c# asp.net - Stack Overflow stackoverflow.com/questions/.../executing-query-in-c-sharp-asp-net ▼ Aug 6, 2012 - Executing query in c# asp.net. No problem. ... What is messageld in your query? ... You can use SQLDataAdapter and Datatable for this :

> https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/fksx3b4f.aspx https://stackoverflow.com/questions/11821907/executing-query-in-c-sharp-asp-

### **Developer Traps**

# How to: Create and Execute an SQL Statement that Returns Rows

### Other Versions -

To execute an SQL statement that returns rows, you can run a TableAdapter query that is configured to run an SQL statement (for example, CustomersTableAdapter.Fill(CustomersDataTable)).

If your application does not use TableAdapters, call the ExecuteReader method on a command object, setting its CommandType property to Text. ("Command object" refers to the specific command for the .NET Framework Data Provider your application is using. For example, if your application is using the .NET Framework Data Provider for SQL Server, the command object would be SqlCommand.)

The following examples show how to execute SQL statements that return rows from a database using either TableAdapters or command objects. For more information on querying with TableAdapters and commands, see Filling Datasets with Data.

# Executing SQL Statements that Return Rows Using a TableAdapter

This example shows how to create a TableAdapter query using the TableAdapter Query Configuration Wizard, and then it provides information on how to declare an instance of the TableAdapter and execute the query.

### Note

Your computer might show different names or locations for some of the Visual Studio user interface elements in the following instructions. The Visual Studio edition that you have and the settings that you use determine these elements. For more information, see Customizing Development Settings in Visual Studio.

Just show me an example!

.°.

To execute an SQL statement returning rows programmatically using a command object

 Add the following code to a method that you want to execute the code from. You return rows by calling the ExecuteReader method of the command (for example, ExecuteReader). The data is returned in a SqlDataReader. For more information on accessing the data in a SqlDataReader, see Retrieving Data Using a DataReader.

```
C#
      VB
 SqlConnection sqlConnection1 = new SqlConnection("Your Connection String");
 SqlCommand cmd = new SqlCommand();
 SqlDataReader reader;
 cmd.CommandText = "SELECT * FROM Customers";
 cmd.CommandType = CommandType.Text;
 cmd.Connection = sqlConnection1;
 sqlConnection1.Open();
 reader = cmd.ExecuteReader();
 // Data is accessible through the DataReader object here.
 sqlConnection1.Close();
```

```
SqlConnection sqlConnection1 = new SqlConnection("Your Connection String");
   SqlCommand cmd = new SqlCommand();
 5
   SqlDataReader reader;
 6
    cmd.CommandText = "SELECT * FROM Customers where username = " + username_from_client;
 8
    cmd.CommandType = CommandType.Text;
 9
    cmd.Connection = sqlConnection1;
10
11
12
    sqlConnection1.0pen();
13
    reader = cmd.ExecuteReader();
14
   // Data is accessible through the DataReader object here.
15
16
17
   sqlConnection1.Close();
```

WOOT! I'm done! That was easy...

**Developer Traps** 

# Executing SQL Statements that Return Rows Using a Command Object

The following example shows how to create a command and execute an SQL statement that returns rows. For information on setting and getting parameter values for a command, see How to: Set and Get Parameters for Command Objects.

# Setting Parameter Values

Before you execute a command, you must set a value for every parameter in the command.

# To set a parameter value

For each parameter in the command's parameters collection, set its Value property.

The following example shows how to set parameters before executing a command that references a stored procedure. The sample assumes that you have already configured the parameters collection with three parameters named au\_id, au\_lname, and au\_fname. The individual parameters are set by name to make it clear which parameter is being set.

```
C# VB
oleDbCommand1.CommandText = "UpdateAuthor";
oleDbCommand1.CommandType = System.Data.CommandType.StoredProcedure;
oleDbCommand1.Parameters["au_id"].Value = "172-32-1176";
oleDbCommand1.Parameters["au_lname"].Value = "White";
oleDbCommand1.Parameters["au_fname"].Value = "Johnson";
```

 .net sql query security
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About 927,000 results (0.61 seconds)

# How to Fix SQL Injection Using Microsoft .Net ...

software-security.sans.org/.../fix-sql-injection-microsoft-.net-with-param... SANS IT application and software security training site. ... Build the query statement using parameterized query. string sql = "SELECT UserId FROM User ...

### How To: Protect From SQL Injection in ASP.NET - MSDN https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff648339.aspx -

Conventional security measures, such as the use of SSL and IPSec, do not protect ... How To: Connect to SQL Server Using SQL Authentication in ASP.NET 2.0. **Developer Traps** 

# How to Fix SQL Injection Using Microsoft .Net Parameterized Queries

# Paramaterized Query

The purpose of a parameterized query is to allow the data source to be able to distinguish executable statements from untrusted data.

A

### Secure Usage

```
// Build the query statement using parameterized query.
     string sal = "SELECT UserId FROM User WHERE " +
 3
                     "UserName = @UserName AND Password = @Password";
     using (SqlCommand cmd = new SqlCommand(sql))
 7
 8
         // Create the parameter objects as specific as possible.
 9
         cmd.Parameters.Add("@UserName", System.Data.SqlDbType.NVarChar, 50);
10
         cmd.Parameters.Add("@Password", System.Data.SqlDbType.NVarChar, 25);
11
12
         // Add the parameter values. Validation should have already happened.
         cmd.Parameters["@UserName"].Value = UserName;
13
14
         cmd.Parameters["@Password"].Value = Password;
15
         cmd.Connection = connection;
40
```

https://software-security.sans.org/developer-how-to/fix-sql-injection-microsoft-.net-with-parameterized-queries

# **The Solution?** Can we make software 100% secure?

Yes there is a way!



### **Defence In Depth**

### Protection


- Traction Control
- Brake Assist System
- Adjustable Steering Column
- Blindspot Warning System
- Daytime Running Lights
- Drivers Knee Airbag
- Fog Lamps
- Front Airbags Driver
- Front Airbags Passenger
- Head Restraints All
- Headup Display
- Lanekeeping Assist
- Passenger Knee Airbag
- Precrash Safety System
- Reversing Camera
- Seatbelt Pretensioner Driver
- Seatbelt Pretensioner Passenger
- Seatbelt Rear 3 Point
- Tyre Pressure Monitor





- Safety Features List
  - Auto Emergency Braking (AEB)
  - Forward Collision Warning
  - Higher Speed AEB
  - Low Speed Auto Emergency Braking
  - Pedestrian Auto Emergency Braking
- Curtain Airbags
- Electronic Stability Control
- Active Braking Systems
- Intelligent Speed Assist ISA
- Active Cruise Control
- Thorax Airbags With Head

Front crumple zone




# **Stepping back in time (Hopefully)...** Whats wrong with the current app sec model?

The current application security model was designed when:

- There were 3-6 month deploy to prod cycles (think waterfall).
- One software stack per company (for example, only allowed to use C#, .NET, SQL Server and IIS).
- Ratio of security people to devs... Well that's always been skewed :)


So how was app sec approached?





PICTURES IN BOXES

# **Security Need To Compromise**



# Why The Security Model Has To Change...

Current Software Development Hipster Principles


- Small teams (Max 5-10)
- Agile development methodologies (move faster)
- Teams can choose what stack to use...But they have to support it (devops).
- CD / CI , deploy to prod daily (move even faster)

Security Talent Shortage

# ~140 Tech Team

1-2 App Sec Team





# THE RADAR

### TECHNIQUES

#### ADOPT

- Capturing client-side JavaScript errors 1
- Continuous delivery for mobile devices 2
- 3 Mobile testing on mobile networks Segregated DOM plus node for IS Testing 4
- 5 Windows infrastructure automation

#### TRIAL

- 6 Capture domain events explicitly
- 7 Client and server rendering with same code
- 8 HTML5 storage instead of cookies
- Instrument all the things 9
- 10 Masterless Chef/Puppet
- 11 Micro-services
- 12 Perimeterless enterprise
- 13 Provisioning testing 14 Structured Logging

#### ASSESS

- 15 Bridging physical and digital worlds with simple hardware
- 16 Collaborative analytics and data science
- 17 Datensparsamkelt
- 18 Development environments in the doud
- 19 Focus on mean time to recovery
- 20 Machine image as a build artifact. 21 Tangible interaction

### HOLD

- 22 Cloud lift and shift
- 23 Ignoring OWASP Top 10
- 24 Siloed metrics
- 25 Velocity as productivity

### PLATFORMS

#### ADOPT

- 26 Elastic Search 27 MongoDB
- 28 Neo4j 29 Nodejs
- 30 Redis
- 31 SMS and USSD as a UI

#### TRIAL


- 32 Hadoop 2.0
- 33 Hadoop as a service
- 34 OpenStack
- 35 PostgreSQL for NoSQL 36 Vumi

#### ASSESS

- 37 Akka 38 Backend as a service
- 39 Low-cost robotics
- 40 PhoneGap/Apache Cordova
- 41 Private Clouds
- 42 SPDV
- 43 Storm
- 44 Web Components standard

#### HOLD

- 45 Big enterprise solutions 46 CMS as a platform
- 47 Enterprise Data Warehouse





### TOOLS

#### ADOPT 48 D3

49 Dependency management for JavaScript

#### TRIAL

- 50 Ansible
- 51 Calabash 52 Chaos Monkey
- 53 Gatting
- 54 Grunt.js
- 55 Hystrix
- 56 kon fonts
- 57 Ubrarian-puppet and Ubrarian-Chef
- 58 Logstash & Graylog2 59 Moco
- 60 Phantom/S
- 61 Prototype On Paper
- 62 SnapCl
- 63 Snowplow Analytics & Plwik

#### ASSESS

2

87

ASSESS

6

A New or moved

No change

HOLD

TRIAL

Δ

78

 $\square$ 

◬

- 64 Cloud-init 65 Docker
- 66 Octopus
- 67 Sensu
- 68 Travis for OSI/IOS
- 69 Visual regression testing tools
- 70 Xamarin

#### HOLD

- 71 Ant
- 72 Heavyweight test tools
- 73 TFS

### LANGUAGES & FRAMEWORKS

#### ADOPT

74 Clojure 75 Dropwizard 76 Scala, the good parts 77 Sinatra

#### TRIAL

- 78 CoffeeScript
- 79 Go language
- 80 Hive
- 81 Play Framework 2
- 82 Reactive Extensions across languages 83 Web API

### ASSESS

- 84 Elkir 85 Julia
- 85 Nancy
- 87 OWIN
- 88 Pester
- 89 Pointer Events

93 Handwritten CSS 94 JSF


- 90 Python 3
- 91 TypeScript 92 Yeoman HOLD


# **Tools/Platforms/Frameworks**

Frame works

Platforms

ata Reference





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# Secure Development Lifecycle. How can we add security into an SDLC?

**Secure Development Lifecycle** 

# It all starts with....

# **CONJOINED TRIANGLES OF** SUCCESS >>> MANUFACTURING SALES AFROM Ξ E R I N G

GROWTH

# Secure SDLC

Training	Inception	Development 🧪	Deployment 📄	Monitoring 📀
Train the tech team about web application security concepts	Review the system design to make sure there are no inherent security weaknesses	Security specific tests are added into the test suite	Automated security scanning tools implemented into the build pipeline	Targeted security testing for complex or high value components
Security awareness throughout the whole product department I.e Brownbags, etc.	Develop realistic attack scenarios and identify high risk areas of projects.	Adoption of security standards, security architecture guidance and security release plans	Deploy static source code security analysis tools into deployment pipeline	Implement ongoing bug bounty program

"Adding security at each phase of a project's lifecycle will ensure the ongoing security of our products."

# **OWASP AppSec Pipeline**




# The OWASP AppSec Rugged DevOps Pipeline Project

The OWASP AppSec Rugged DevOps Pipeline Project is the place to find the information you need to increase the speed and automation of your AppSec program. Using the documentation and references of this project will allow you to setup your own AppSec Pipeline.

# Description

The AppSec pipeline project is a place to gather together information, techniques and tools to create your own AppSec Pipeline. AppSec Pipelines takes the principles of DevOps and Lean and applies that to an application security program. The project will gather references, cheat sheets, and specific guidance for tools/software which would compose an AppSec Pipeline.

**OWASP AppSec Pipeline** 



**Security Training** 

Workshop 1 -Thinking Like A Hacker Workshop 2 -Web Security Fundamentals Workshop 3 -Attacking Common Web Vulnerabilities (continued)

Capture The Flag Challenge

- Cyber security trends.
- Hacker motivations.
- Dark Markets.
- Thinking like a hacker.
- Secure Development Lifecycle.
- Web hackers toolkit.

- Application security overview
- HTTP
- SSL/TLS
- Cookies
- Untrusted Data
- Cross-site scripting
- SQL Injection

- More common vulnerabilities. CORS
- Security Headers

Compete against each other to solve several web security challenges.

## **Secure Code Warrior**

# **Hone Your Skills**


Practice finding, identifying and fixing real-world software security vulnerabilities.

# **Defend Your Code**


Defeat the attackers targeting your client's systems and code to gain points. Rise through the levels to tackle more difficult security vulnerabilities in critical systems.

# **Demonstrate Your Expertise**

Compete against other developers and see how you rate compared with other developers in your industry or region.




### **Secure Code Warrior**





# **Bug Bounty Programs**




Bug Bounty Programs - Even the playing field


~100 Bounty Hunters

# 

~100 Tech Team




# **Bug Bounty Programs**



# What can i start doing tomorrow to improve security?

**OWASP Top 10** 

- Awareness document for web application security.
- Updated every 3 years.
- Short descriptions and example scenarios.
- Broad consensus about what the most critical web application security flaws are.



OWASP Top 10

# T10 OWASP Top 10 Application Security Risks – 2013

A1 – Injection	Injection flaws, such as SQL, OS, and LDAP injection occur when untrusted data is sent to an interpreter as part of a command or query. The attacker's hostile data can trick the interpreter into executing unintended commands or accessing data without proper authorization.			
A2 – Broken Authentication and Session Management	Application functions related to authentication and session management are often not implemented correctly, allowing attackers to compromise passwords, keys, or session tokens, or to exploit other implementation flaws to assume other users' identities.			
A3 – Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	XSS flaws occur whenever an application takes untrusted data and sends it to a web browser without proper validation or escaping. XSS allows attackers to execute scripts in the victim's browser which can hijack user sessions, deface web sites, or redirect the user to malicious sites.			
A4 – Insecure Direct Object References	A direct object reference occurs when a developer exposes a reference to an internal implementation object, such as a file, directory, or database key. Without an access control check or other protection, attackers can manipulate these references to access unauthorized data.			

OWASP Top 10



Threat	Attack	Security		Technical	Business
Agents	Vectors	Weakness		Impacts	Impacts
Application Specific	Exploitability	Prevalence	Detectability	impact	Application /
	EASY	COMMON	AVERAGE	SEVERE	Business Specific
Consider anyone who can send untrusted data to the system, including external users, internal users, and administrators.	Attacker sends simple text-based attacks that exploit the syntax of the targeted interpreter. Almost any source of data can be an injection vector, including internal sources.	particularly in legacy code. They are often found in SQL, LDAP, Xpath, or NoSQL		Injection can result in data loss or corruption, lack of accountability, or denial of access. Injection can sometimes lead to complete host takeover.	Consider the business value of the affected data and the platform running the interpreter. All data could be stolen, modified, or deleted. Could you reputation be harmed?

# Am I Vulnerable To Injection?

The best way to find out if an application is vulnerable to injection is to verify that <u>all</u> use of interpreters clearly


# **How Do I Prevent Injection?**

Preventing injection requires keeping untrusted data separate from commands and queries.

**OWASP Testing Guide** 

- Explains how to test different categories of security vulnerabilities.
- Gives an overview of how to integrate security into an SDLC.
- Just released (2015).
- Free to download!





# **OWASP Testing Guide**

### Authentication Testing

Testing for Credentials Transported over an Encrypted Channel (OTG-AUTHN-001) Testing for default credentials (OTG-AUTHN-002) Testing for Weak lock out mechanism (OTG-AUTHN-003) Testing for bypassing authentication schema (OTG-AUTHN-004) Test remember password functionality (OTG-AUTHN-005) Testing for Browser cache weakness (OTG-AUTHN-006) Testing for Weak password policy (OTG-AUTHN-007) Testing for Weak security question/answer (OTG-AUTHN-008) Testing for weak password change or reset functionalities (OTG-AUTHN-009) Testing for Weaker authentication in alternative channel (OTG-AUTHN-010) Authorization Testing Testing Directory traversal/file include (OTG-AUTHZ-001) Testing for bypassing authorization schema (OTG-AUTHZ-002) Testing for Privilege Escalation (OTG-AUTHZ-003) Testing for Insecure Direct Object References (OTG-AUTHZ-004) Session Management Testing Testing for Bypassing Session Management Schema (OTG-SESS-001) Testing for Cookies attributes (OTG-SESS-002) Testing for Session Fixation (OTG-SESS-003) Testing for Exposed Session Variables (OTG-SESS-004)

Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) (OTG-SESS-005) Testing for logout functionality (OTG-SESS-006)

Testing for Error Handling Analysis of Error Codes (OTG-ERR-001) Analysis of Stack Traces (OTG-ERR-002) Testing for weak Cryptography Testing for Weak SSL/TLS Ciphers, Insufficient Transport Layer Protection (OTG-CRYPST-001) Testing for Padding Oracle (OTG-CRYPST-002) Testing for Sensitive information sent via unencrypted channels (OTG-CRYPST-003) **Business Logic Testing** Test Business Logic Data Validation (OTG-BUSLOGIC-001) Test Ability to Forge Requests (OTG-BUSLOGIC-002) Test Integrity Checks (OTG-BUSLOGIC-003) Test for Process Timing (OTG-BUSLOGIC-004) Test Number of Times a Function Can be Used Limits (OTG-BUSLOGIC-005) Testing for the Circumvention of Work Flows (OTG-BUSLOGIC-006) Test Defenses Against Application Mis-use (OTG-BUSLOGIC-007) Test Upload of Unexpected File Types (OTG-BUSLOGIC-008) Test Upload of Malicious Files (OTG-BUSLOGIC-009) **Client Side Testing** Testing for DOM based Cross Site Scripting (OTG-CLIENT-001) Testing for JavaScript Execution (OTG-CLIENT-002) Testing for HTML Injection (OTG-CLIENT-003) Testing for Client Side URL Redirect (OTG-CLIENT-004)

Testing for CSS Injection (OTG-CLIENT-005)

Testing for Client Side Resource Manipulation (OTG-CLIENT-006)

**Proxies** 



# Who has used a proxy before?








# ZAP

- 1. Open Source (and free!!).
- 2. Cross platform (Java).
- 3. Has security specific features (Fuzzer, auto scanner, etc).
- 4. Can be run in headless mode with API (think automation and build pipeline).

# Firefox

- 1. Uses its own Proxy settings (not the OS's like Chrome, etc).
- 2. Has its own list of certificates so we do not have to add the ZAP cert to the OS list.



**The Second Message** 

 Being aware of software security is half the battle.

- Hackers are here to stay.
- Implementing a Secure
   Development Lifecycle is a must.



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